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Twiqbal In Context
Christine P. Bartholomew

Introduction
Muddled cases make muddled classes—or do they? In 2007, the Supreme
Court ushered in a new pleading threshold for complaints,1 changing a fiftyyear bedrock of civil procedure doctrine. By retiring notice pleading, Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly effectively altered Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8
and 12(b)(6)—forgoing merit-based determinations that long served as the
core of civil procedure gatekeeping.2
Twombly and the related decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 collectively referenced
as Twiqbal,4 create a plausibility standard. Judges are to evaluate the viability
of a plaintiff’s pre-discovery factual allegations by using common sense based
on judicial experience.5 While some praise the new standard, others push to
legislatively overturn it as lower courts struggle to define what is plausible.6
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1.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).

2.

See id. at 563.

3.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

4.

See, e.g., Weiler v. Draper Chevrolet Co., No. 12-12402, 2013 WL 388585, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
2013); Dec v. Pa. State Police, No. 2:12-CV-565, 2012 WL 6099078, at *6 (W.D. Pa. 2012);
RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“There is a
‘new sheriff in town’ now policing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and his name is ‘Twiqbal.’”). See generally
Cristina Calvar, Note, “Twiqbal”: A Political Tool, 37 J. Legis. 200, 202 n.21 (2012) (observing that
“[t]he nickname ‘Twiqbal’ has gained increasing popularity when collectively referring to
the heightened pleading requirements set forth by Twombly and Iqbal”); David Mills, Twombly,
Courtoons (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.courtoons.net/2009/10/23/twombly/ (providing
illustration of Twiqbal’s effect on some plaintiffs).

5.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64 (“[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is
context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common
sense.”).

6.

See S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (“Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009”); H.R. 4115, 111th
Cong. (2009) (“Open Access to Courts Act of 2009”).
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As someone who worked on Twombly before entering academia, I am wellversed in the debates over the new standard.7 Rather than echoing them, this
Article has a different focus, namely the obstacles Twiqbal poses for law students
and their professors preparing them for practice in a post-Twiqbal world. Twiqbal
comes up in multiple law school classes, starting in first-year civil procedure,
and revisited in upper-division courses such as Complex Civil Litigation,
Employment, Antitrust, and litigation drafting classes. In each iteration, the
plausibility standard generates pedagogical challenges. This Article explores
these challenges, focusing particularly on those that arise in introductory civil
procedure courses.
Teaching Twiqbal is imperative. Not only do the cases offer an opening
to explore pleading standards, they are a springboard for discussions of
gatekeeping, the differences between rules and standards, and foundational
questions about the function of civil procedure. On the more practice-oriented
side, Twiqbal introduces pre-filing investigation and drafting—skills essential for
practice readiness.8
However, pleading after Twiqbal is somewhat of an enigma. Scholars
hotly debate the foundational question of whether “plausibility” is a new
pleading standard, let alone what the standard is.9 Teaching Twiqbal is further
complicated because the impact of the revised pleading standard heavily
depends on the substantive law at issue—leaving civil procedure professors to
explain this nebulous intersection to students just learning what a legal claim
is. This challenge is compounded by the realities of class size and limited time
to devote to any one topic.
Even in my informal discussions with other civil procedure scholars,
passing references to Twiqbal generate empathetic head-shaking and knowing
sighs of frustration. However, given pleading is the first step of any litigation,10
7.

See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 535
(2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 Iowa
L. Rev. 821 (2010); Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading, 90 Or. L. Rev.
955 (2012); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1 (2010); Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative
Theory to Understand and Overcome the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 Yale J.L. & Human. 1 (2014).

8.

See, e.g., Raleigh Hannah Levine, Of Learning Civil Procedure, Practicing Civil Practice, and Studying
a Civil Action: A Low-Cost Proposal to Introduce First-Year Law Students to the Neglected MacCrate
Skills, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 479, 482-83 (2000) (discussing factual investigation as part of
practice-readiness).

9.

See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 Iowa L. Rev.
873, 877 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly does not alter pleading rules
in as drastic a way as many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose.”);
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1299 (2010) (“[P]roperly
understood, the post-Iqbal pleading framework is not fundamentally in conflict with notice
pleading, because the most significant pre-Twombly authorities on federal pleading remain
good law and because the troublesome plausibility standard is rendered irrelevant when a
plaintiff provides nonconclusory allegations for each element of a claim.”).

10.

Understanding the new federal pleading standard is particularly important, since the
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just decrying the opinions’ problematic aspects and hoping for the best does
little good to prepare students. Yet I worry that traditional Socratic lecture
fails to help students explore the contours of the decisions.11 Instead, teaching
Twiqbal requires attention to context: the context necessary to understand both
why Twiqbal is challenging to teach and the consequences of the plausibility
standard.
This Article discusses these dual levels of context. It begins by providing
a brief overview of Twiqbal, one that recognizes that the facts of both cases
are well-known and does not belabor them more than necessary to present
the remainder of the Article. Second, I theorize why students struggle so
mightily to process the nuanced difference between plausibility and notice
pleading—let alone the larger implications of the distinction. Third, I set forth
one solution for increasing student understanding of this complex aspect of
civil procedure jurisprudence. Though this solution is tailored to teaching
pleading, the decision process behind this solution should resonate with other
professors seeking alternative teaching methods to troublesome doctrines.
I. Evolving Pleading Standards
This Part details how Twiqbal fits into the evolving history of pleading
requirements. This quick primer foreshadows the teaching challenges Twiqbal
poses. For close to fifty years, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
simply required “notice pleading.”12 A complaint needed only to provide “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief” to survive a motion to dismiss.13 Rule 8 was part of a significant
reform effort to ensure “the due subordination of civil procedure to the ends
of substantive justice.”14 The drafters sought to liberalize pleading standards,
making it easier to bring suit than under the prior code pleading requirements.15
majority of state courts have modeled their pleading requirements after the federal standard.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“Taking
their cues from the federal courts, twenty six States and the District of Columbia utilize
as their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the majority repudiates:
whether it appears “beyond doubt” that “no set of facts” in support of the claim would
entitle the plaintiff to relief.”).
11.

See, e.g., Suzanne Dallimore, The Socratic Method—More Harm than Good, 3 J. Contemp. L. 177,
177 (1977); Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The Debate
over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 1, 6 (1998); Laura Kalman, To Hell with
Langdell!, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 771, 771-72 (1995); Jenny Morgan, The Socratic Method: Silencing
Cooperation, 1 Legal Educ. Rev. 151, 153 (1989); Bernard J. Ward, The Problem Method at Notre
Dame, 11 J. Legal Educ. 100, 100-01 (1958).

12.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (stating a complaint need only include “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”).

13.

Id.

14.

Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 Wash. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938).

15.

Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 St. John’s L.
Rev. 877, 877 (2008) (“The drafters rejected . . . pleading rules . . . which generally required
a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish a cause of action.”). The previous standard
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With Conley v. Gibson in 1957,16 the Supreme Court further solidified this
liberal pleading standard. Under Conley, as long as the trial court can construe
the facts in a complaint to state a claim, it should deny a motion to dismiss.17
The decision articulated the seminal test for a complaint: “In appraising the
sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”18 Rather than an early screening,
a court evaluates allegations either on summary judgment or at trial, after
a plaintiff has had an opportunity to build a case through discovery.19 This
generous pleading standard was intended to bolster access to justice and
private enforcement efforts.20
Lower courts did not always welcome this progression toward more liberal
pleading.21 These courts and other critics raised concerns about the high cost
of discovery and expanding caseloads in federal courts to continue pushing
for more procedural gatekeeping.22 Nonetheless, for many years appellate
was the Field Code. Established in 1848, the Field Code moved pleading away from the
rigor of the English Common Law system. English Common Law (and in particular the
Hilary Rules) established “a period of the strictest pleading ever known.” Charles E. Clark,
Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458-59 (1943); Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of
Code Pleading 14-15 (1928). The Field Code meant to simplify this rigor by requiring only a
short statement of the facts “showing that there was a cause of action.” Jack B. Weinstein &
Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 518,
520-21 (1957). But in application, courts still construed the Field Code to require unrealistic
factual specificity. Id.
16.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).

17.

Id. at 47-48 & n.8; cf. Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation
in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1997, 2000 (2010) (“For nearly fifty
years, courts and commentators viewed the pleading stage as a relatively weak point for the
exercise of gatekeeping.”).

18.

Conley, 355 U.S.at 45-46.

19.

See, e.g., Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (discussing how after the advent of
notice pleading the primary screening of cases shifted from motions to dismiss to summary
judgment); see also Effron, supra note 17, at 2005 & n.11 (“The Rule was not meant to serve a
gatekeeping function for meritorious lawsuits.”); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice
Pleading, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 987, 994 (2003).

20.

See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 431, 434 (2008) [hereinafter
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading] (explaining Rule 8 had been written so that “pleadings were no
longer to be a substantial hurdle to be overcome before plaintiffs could gain access to the
courts”).

21.

See Jason G. Gottesman, Speculating as to the Plausible: Pleading Practice After Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 17 Widener L.J. 973, 983 (2008) (detailing lower courts pushing back against
liberal pleading standards).

22.

See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Final Report of the Joint Project of the Am.
Coll. of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Inst. for the Advancement
of the Am. Legal System 2-3 (2009), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/

748

Journal of Legal Education

courts and the Supreme Court reinforced notice pleadings with citations back
to Conley.23
In 2007, the Supreme Court reversed course in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.24
Twombly involved allegations of market allocation in the cable industry. Brought
as a putative class action, the plaintiffs alleged four cable carriers engaged in
parallel conduct in violation of the Sherman Act to keep potential competitors
out of the market. This horizontal agreement unlawfully inflated the price of
local telephone use and high-speed Internet access.25
The Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim. Under the Sherman Act, mere “conscious parallelism” (meaning
competitors acting in the same fashion) is insufficient.26 Instead, the plaintiffs
must allege “plus factors” indicative of an anticompetitive agreement. The
district court held the complaint did not include sufficient facts to cross
from conscious parallelism to a horizontal agreement.27 The Second Circuit
reversed, noting the plaintiffs need not plead specific facts of an actual
agreement. Rather, paraphrasing the Conley standard, the Second Circuit held
a motion should be dismissed only if it provides “no set of facts that would
publications/actl-iaals_final_report_rev_8-4-10.pdf.
23.

See, e.g., Swierkiewicz. v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (emphasizing that
discovery and summary judgment are the way to screen out unmeritorious cases—not
heightened pleading requirements); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading standard for
section 1983 claims as “impossible to square . . . with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’
set up by the Federal Rules.”); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A
Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1710, 1721 (2013) [hereinafter Spencer, Pleading
and Access] (detailing the lower court and appellate court tug of war over pleading standards).

24.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). While Twiqbal was the Supreme Court’s
first retreat from liberal pleading standards, the Court’s 1986 summary judgment trilogy,
including Matsushita v. Zenith, arguably foreshadowed this move toward heightened procedural
gatekeeping. Rather than continuing to embrace a pro-access policy, the Court strengthened
summary judgment mechanisms as a way to screen out cases a trial court concludes the
claims asserted are not sufficiently “probable” to be tried by a jury. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 601 (1986). For a thorough discussion of the
trilogy, see, e.g., Marcy J. Levine, Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal
in the 1986 Supreme Court, 37 Emory L.J. 171, 215 (1988); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982 (2003).

25.

See Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 550-52.

26.

See, e.g., Theatre Enters. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)
(discussing conscious parallelism); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 672 (1962) (“[M]ere
interdependence of basic price decisions is not conspiracy.”).

27.

Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated and remanded,
425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was
the product of collusion rather than coincidence.”28
On appeal, the Supreme Court retired the “plain and simple” interpretation
of Rule 8. Citing concerns about litigation expense,29 the Court instead required
plaintiffs plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”30 Circumstantial evidence of an agreement alone would not suffice.31 In
rejecting the long-established “no set of facts” standard, the Court in Twombly
departed from generous pleading standards. Despite this marked change, the
majority stated it was not setting forth a new standard nor imposing heightened
pleading but rather clarifying the existing requirement.32 The Court provided
lower courts little further guidance except to tell judges to rely on “common
economic experience.”33
This decision generated significant confusion, particularly given the Twombly
complaint had alleged facts for several plus factors.34 After the decision, some
commentators and practitioners held on to the affirmation that Twombly had not
changed the long-standing notice pleading standard. Others assumed the new
pleading standard was limited to antitrust or, if more broadly defined, limited
to similar allegations of conspiracy. But the following year, the Supreme Court
clarified the plausibility standard was transsubstantive in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.35
Iqbal involved allegations of wrongdoing related to the post-9/11 detainment
of Javaid Iqbal.36 Mr. Iqbal was detained and held in the most restrictive
confinement conditions known in the federal detainment system for allegedly
28.

Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

29.

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 546.

30.

See id. at 547.

31.

Id. at 545-56 (“A parallel conduct allegation gets the § 1 complaint close to stating a claim,
but without … factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility.”).

32.

Id. at 570. This language is particularly interesting given that in neither opinion does the
Court use the term “notice” pleading. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:
A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1, 19 (2010).

33.

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 564.

34.

For example, the complaint alleged: (1) ILECs “provid[ed] inferior connections to the
networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the CLEC’s relationships
with their own customers”; (2) ILECs refused to seek out “‘attractive business opportunities’
in contiguous markets where they possessed ‘substantial competitive advantages’”; as well
as allegations that an ILEC executive’s own statement that “competing in the territory of
another ILEC . . . [is not] right.” Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 40-42, 50, Twombly v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated and remanded, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005),
rev’d, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

35.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions . . .”).

36.

See id. at 667-68.
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using an improperly obtained Social Security number.37 He alleged that he
and other Arab detainees were treated as terrorist suspects despite the lack of
evidence of terrorist involvement. He further alleged this mistreatment was
unlawfully based on race, religion, and national origin.38
Some of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.39 The trial court
denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed.40 However, the Supreme
Court reversed. The Court held there was a plausible, lawful alternative
explanation for Iqbal’s allegations of daily strip-searches, solitary confinement,
and shackling whenever he left his cell.41 As the majority viewed the allegations:
It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement
to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks
would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though
the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the
facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and
justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally
present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who
committed terrorist acts. As between that “obvious alternative explanation”
for the arrests and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks
to us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.42

The decision arguably applied an even higher standard than Twombly.43
Under Iqbal, courts are instructed to undertake a two-step process for screening
complaints: (1) distinguish facts from legal conclusions; and (2) based on those
facts, use “judicial experience and common sense” to evaluate whether there
is a plausible claim for relief.44 This sifting through allegations to sort legal
conclusions from facts allows judges to screen out weak, not just implausible,
cases.45
Referenced jointly as Twiqbal, the new pleading standard shepherded in
more aggressive screening of complaints. But what that standard actually is
and how to apply it is still debated. In the nine years since Twombly, courts
are no closer to understanding the new standard. As Professors Jill Curry
and Matthew Ward noted, “Twombly was cited over 13,000 times by its one37.

See id.

38.

See id. at 669.

39.

See id.

40.

See id. at 670.

41.

See id.

42.

Id. at 682.

43.

See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85
Notre Dame L. Rev. 849, 850 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, Plausibility Pleading] (discussing how
Iqbal “signals an even stricter approach to pleading requirements.”).

44.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

45.

See Bone, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 850.
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year anniversary, and the lower courts ‘reached every conceivable answer’ in
applying the Court’s ‘mixed signals.’”46
While legislative attempts to overturn Twiqbal have been introduced, they
have languished in the current political gridlock.47 Requests for Supreme
Court clarification of the standard have been equally unsuccessful. As one
such appeal noted, “Lower courts’ wildly inconsistent application of Iqbal and
Twombly is not a feature unique to [certain] claims; it is symptomatic of a larger
problem: courts’ inability to reach any consensus of the state of the court’s
pleading jurisprudence.”48 Thus, at least for the near future, the problems with
Twiqbal are here to stay.
II. Problems Teaching the Irresoluble
Twombly and Iqbal invite critical debates about the role of procedural rules,
the need for curbing discovery abuse, and the competing considerations of
judicial access. Such debates, however, first require a clear understanding of
what remains unclear post-Twiqbal. As law professors are well-aware, when rules
lack solid contours, law students often get confused or frustrated, assuming
the professor is hiding the ball. Students commonly respond to uncertainty by
distilling material into oversimplistic, single-rule sentences. This is not unique
to pleading standards or even civil procedure. Twiqbal is but one example of
legal doctrine that conflicts with students’ deep desire to extract black-letter
rules—absolutes without consideration of nuance.
This Part highlights some of the key difficulties with teaching Twiqbal.
Necessarily, this discussion overlaps with the problems I see in the cases
themselves. Rather than a theoretical critique of the cases, though, this Part
explores teaching plausibility to law students. In particular, this Part explains
three facets of the plausibility standard that students struggle with: (1) how
different the new plausibility standard is; (2) what exactly the standard
requires; and (3) the gatekeeping rationale behind the standard.
A. Twiqbal Versus Conley: Did Twiqbal Really Change Much?
Twiqbal is hardly a model of clarity in drafting.49 The decisions are confusing
independently, but even more so when read conjunctively. Introducing this
confusion into a first-year civil procedure class presents significant pedagogical
challenges. My students struggle to see how radical a departure Twiqbal is from
46.

Jill Curry & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs File? A Study
Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 827, 831 (2013) (citations omitted).

47.

In 2009, two Acts were proposed to amend the new pleading standard: the Notice Pleading
Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) and the Open Access to Courts Act of
2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).

48.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1845 (2015)
(No. 14-969).

49.

Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 606 (2007).
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traditional notice pleading and, in particular, the standard in Conley.50 As a
student once asked me, “Isn’t a complaint that puts a defendant on notice a
plausible claim?”
Even just walking students through Twombly illustrates the internal tension
in the majority opinion. The majority concedes it lacks the power to heighten
pleading standards absent a legislative amendment.51 It also notes that a
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations.”52 At the same time,
though, the decision rejects Justice Black’s language in Conley,53 going so far as
to say the “no sets of facts” language is “best forgotten as an incomplete negative
gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”54 However, the decision reaffirms
prior cases applying Conley, suggesting that perhaps the two standards are not
all that different. Thus, when asked whether Conley is still good law, students
frequently struggle; they often frame their answers in terms of the Court “not
liking” the decision but cannot say for sure whether Twiqbal overturned Conley.55
50.

In fact, as Professor Benjamin Spencer explains, some defenders of the Twiqbal standard
similarly argue that “nothing has changed beyond the language we use to describe the
pleading standard.” Spencer, Pleading and Access, supra note 23, at 1715 (2013) (footnote
omitted); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev.
473, 484-85 (2010) (“Courts have long held that legal conclusions need not be accepted as
true on 12(b)(6) motions, have long insisted that pleaders are not entitled to unreasonable
factual inferences, and have long treated ‘legal conclusions,’ ‘unwarranted deductions,’
‘unwarranted inferences,’ ‘unsupported conclusions,’ and ‘sweeping legal conclusions cast in
the form of factual allegations’ as ‘more or less synonymous’ terms. So understood, Twombly’s
insistence that the inference of conspiracy be ‘plausible’ is equivalent to the traditional
insistence that an inference be ‘reasonable.”’ (footnote omitted)).

51.

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (2007).

52.

Id. at 555.

53.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007).

54.

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 563.

55.

This confusion over the import of the new plausibility standard is not unique to students.
Rather, it continues in legal scholarship. On one hand, Twombly and Iqbal have been called
the most “significant” pleading decisions in the past fifty years. See, e.g., Timothy Beyer, Amy
Benson & Mark Mathews, Pleading Standards After Twombly: Surviving A Motion to Dismiss, 37
Colo. Law. 29 (2008) (“Twombly marks a clear departure from prior liberal federal pleading
standards—and may represent one of the most significant pronouncements on pleading
by the Supreme Court in the past fifty years.”). At the same time, others have argued the
decisions do not change much—either because the plausibility standard is not actually any
alteration of the pleading standard or, even if it is, the alteration doesn’t matter. See, e.g.,
Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33 (2009) (statement of Gregory C.
Katsas, former Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (claiming
that Twombly and Iqbal “faithfully interpret” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are
consistent with precedent); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 Pepp. L. Rev.
1063, 1064 (2009) (arguing that the plausibility standard is both coherent and required by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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Moreover, what the new standard requires is equally obtuse. Though Iqbal
attempts to define plausibility, it does so by drawing an artificial distinction
between plausibility and probability:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s
liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’”56

This language creates a spectrum from possible to probable, with plausibility
some place between those two ends.57 However, it does so without clearly
defining either end and without clarifying whether plausible is closer to the
possible or probable end.58
Post-Iqbal, there is arguably a need for allegations closer to the level of
“proof” previously reserved for summary judgment. This complicates teaching
different procedural stages to 1Ls. With courts beginning to blur motions to
dismiss and summary judgment screening,59 students unsurprisingly struggle
to distinguish a sufficiently plausible complaint from a claim that is sufficiently
probable to survive summary judgment. Admittedly, it is not clear that all
judges would draw the same line, but this lack of context only exacerbates law
students’ struggle to understand how different the new plausibility standard
is.
B. Teaching Undefined Plausibility
Once students begin to see that plausibility is something new, they then
struggle to figure out what that something actually is.60 While the Twiqbal
56.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

57.

Effron, supra note 17, at 2016.

58.

As Judge Posner explains, “[P]lausibility, probability, and possibility overlap. Probability
runs the gamut from a zero likelihood to a certainty. What is impossible has a zero likelihood
of occurring and what is plausible has a moderately high likelihood of occurring. The fact that
the allegations undergirding a claim could be true is no longer enough to save a complaint
from being dismissed; the complaint must establish a nonnegligible probability that the
claim is valid, but the probability need not be as great as such terms as ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ connote.” In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted).

59.

For example, in Mangum v. Town of Holly Springs, the Eastern District of North Carolina
considered a complaint based on allegations of a hostile work environment. In dismissing
the complaint, the court rejected some of the plaintiff’s specific allegations, not based on
being legal conclusions, but rather for being inadmissible hearsay. See 551 F. Supp. 2d 439,
443-44 (E.D.N.C. 2008).

60.

Cf. Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural
Uniformity, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1431 (2008) (“In place of Conley-style notice pleading, the
Court substituted a vague ‘plausibility standard’ that has confounded the legal community
since its inception.”).
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decisions are fast becoming some of the most cited Supreme Court cases,61
the actual perimeters of the new standard remain a mystery. This adds to the
challenges of teaching pleading.
First, to understand pleading and the concurrent drafting process requires
students to develop a series of foundational skills. Pleading a claim starts
with the elements and supporting factors of the claim. From there, pleading
requires gathering facts to allege each element. Then, these gathered facts
need to be transposed into actionable allegations. It is at this stage that the
practical implications of Twiqbal become most apparent.
Under Iqbal’s two-step test, a trial court first disregards legal conclusions,
then uses “experience and common sense” to decide if the remaining facts
present a plausible claim. Novice law students are just learning the distinction
between factors and elements, let alone the requisite elements for a given
claim. The difference between facts and legal conclusions is often lost on
them, as students’ primary exposure to facts are pre-packaged, distilled facts
presented in case law textbooks.62 Further, the difference between a legal
conclusion and a fact is hardly clear cut.63 As Professor Hartnett explains, “any
allegation can be considered ‘conclusory’ in the sense that one can always ask
for the underlying information that supports an allegation.”64 Given this lack
of expertise, when asked in lecture, students are quick to recite Iqbal’s two-step
heuristic, though they struggle to articulate the limitations of this test.
For example, take a straightforward right-of-publicity claim. The elements
are sufficiently clear, making the cause of action one that lends itself well to
use with first-year students. A plaintiff has a right to relief when an aspect of
61.

Robert D. Owen & Travis Mock, The Plausibility of Pleadings After Twombly and Iqbal, 11
Sedona Conf. J. 181 (2010) (“Twombly is already one of the 20 most cited cases of all time in
the federal courts, and Iqbal averages over 300 new citations per month. But this abundance
of analysis has so far failed to coalesce around a concrete and workable interpretation of the
‘plausibility standard’ introduced by these two important decisions.”) (footnote omitted).

62.

See, e.g., Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching
Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 731, 731 (2003) (describing law
students’ course of study as “the steady diet of common-law appellate opinions, particularly
in the first year . . . .”); Paula Schaefer, Injecting Law Student Drama into the Classroom: Transforming
an E-Discovery Class (or Any Law School Class) with a Complex, Student-Generated Simulation, 12 Nev.
L.J. 130, 137 (2011) (discussing how students need more experience using facts).

63.

This lack of a clear distinction between fact and law was the basis for Souter’s dissent in
Iqbal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687; see also Donald J. Kochan, While Effusive, “Conclusory” Is Still
Quite Elusive: The Story of a Word, Iqbal, and a Perplexing Lexical Inquiry of Supreme Importance, 73 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 215, 248 (2011) (“Souter could not see a principled, discernable standard in the
majority opinion for conclusory versus nonconclusory allegations. Souter believed that the
majority’s application of the conclusory standard was inappropriate because a court must
look at an allegation’s place in the whole complaint before it can decide whether or not it is
conclusory.”) (footnotes omitted).

64.

Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly: An Update After Matrixx, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs.
37, 40 (2012) (citation omitted); see also Joyce J. George, Judicial Opinion Writing
Handbook 198 (5th ed., Hein 2007) (“The difference between a decision and findings
of fact and conclusions of law is one in form only.”) (emphasis added).

Twiqbal In Context

755

his person (usually his image, name, voice, or signature) is commercially used
without permission. But what factual statements are necessary under Twiqbal is
more difficult to parse. Consider these three variations of the same allegations:
(1) the defendant used the plaintiff’s picture on a CD cover without permission;
(2) the defendant used the plaintiff’s picture on a CD cover without first
contacting the plaintiff to ask for permission; and (3) the defendant wrongly
used the plaintiff’s image without permission. Arguably, (3) is too conclusory:
“wrongly” is a legal conclusion that would be disregarded under the first step
of the Iqbal test. Statement (2) is better than (1) as it provides more concrete
fact statements. But whether statement (2) would suffice under Twiqbal is not
clear. Statement (2) includes “used”.. Is that a legal conclusion? The answer
may very well depend, as courts have adopted varying levels of plausibility.65
For students seeking the “right” answer, this uncertainty can be off-putting
but is a key part of learning about the law, not just in civil procedure but
throughout legal education.66
Second, beyond segregating facts from legal conclusions, Twiqbal requires
further context that students rarely have about judges and the limitations of
judicial “common sense and experience.”67 Under Twiqbal, courts are instructed
to use their common sense and experience to delineate a plausible claim from
a possible one. Students, notably in their first year, focus more on extracting
tests from opinions than on considering the author of those opinions. By
teaching law through the case method, law schools make judicial opinions the
keys to unlocking the elusive black-letter law students seek. However, learning
more about generalist judges and the composition of the federal judiciary is
65.

See, e.g., Owen & Mock, supra note 61, at 183 (discussing the differing approaches circuits have
taken in response to Twiqbal).

66.

As Professor Woodward aptly explains:
I would argue that objectivity, in human affairs, especially, is not so easily achieved.
Law students, above all, should understand this. Lawyers do not capture justice,
as if they were caging a lion. In a trial, each side makes its argument from its own
perspective and for the benefit of a client. And the assumption is that only through this
adversarial procedure will justice be served—though of course it often isn’t. Or, since this
is a Catholic university, consider Sacred Scripture. The Bible speaks differently to the
poor than to the well off. Indeed, the Bible itself is a tissue of internal rereadings: the
later books of the Bible reinterpret the earlier ones and of course the New Testament
radically reinterprets the old. And all this developed long before Friedrich Nietzsche
ever wrote a word.
Kenneth L. Woodward, Neither “Objective” Nor “Post-Modern,” 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics &
Pub. Pol’y 719, 724 (2005).

67.

Students often know little about the homogeny of the judiciary. Students, particularly in
the first year, view judges without a critical eye—rarely going past the opinion to consider
the author of that opinion. They know little of the homogeny of the judiciary, making it
harder for them to understand the limitations of this “judicial experience.” Judges are
disproportionately white males, with a shared elite background. They frequently come from
families with judges. Their schooling is frequently limited to Ivy League or other private
law schools. See Robert A. Carp & Ronald Stidham, Outline of the U.S. Legal System
142, 154 (2001), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/media/pdf/books/legalotln.pdf (discussing
judges’ backgrounds).
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a prerequisite for law students to understand how “common sense” differs
with the ideologies and values brought to the bench. As Professor Malveaux
explains, “[b]ased on differences among judges, one judge may dismiss a
complaint while another concludes that it survives, solely because of the way
each judge applies his or her ‘judicial experience and common sense.’”68
Third, students often lack sufficient context to understand how plausibility
depends on the substantive law involved.69 As Senator Arlen Spector noted
soon after Twiqbal:
The effect of the Court’s actions will no doubt be to deny many plaintiffs with
meritorious claims access to the federal courts and, with it, any legal redress
for their injuries . . . . I think that is an especially unwelcome development
at a time when, with the litigating resources of our executive-branch and
administrative agencies stretched thin, the enforcement of federal antitrust,
consumer protection, civil rights and other laws that benefit the public will
fall increasingly to private litigants.70

Senator Spector’s warning proved accurate. For example, in antitrust,
Twiqbal permits a judge to decide whether she believes a particular restraint is
plausible in a given industry. This subjectivity has generated disproportionate
antitrust claim dismissals—without evidence that the complaints for such
claims are more flawed than other claims. Specifically, two out of every three
antitrust cases filed since Twombly have been dismissed—a figure nearly twentyfive percent higher than in torts or contract cases.71
My law students rarely enter civil procedure class with knowledge about
the different elements of a variety of causes of action. Even for those students
with some legal experience, it is often limited to a single area of law, meaning
they still lack knowledge about common fact patterns in analogous cases.
As Professor Kris Franklin notes elsewhere in this symposium, this lack of
experience is “one reason why they can have a hard time understanding how
procedural rules operate in the real world.”72 Perhaps it is not surprising, then,
68.

Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.
621, 624 (2011).

69.

See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly
and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 Yale L.J. 2270, 2326-27 (2012) [hereinafter Gelbach,
Locking the Doors] (“Among total other cases, the filing rate increased from 3.1% to 5.0%. For
employment discrimination and civil rights cases, the 12(b)(6) MTD filing rate increased
from 6.9% to 9.0 percent [sic], and from 10.8% to 12.1%, respectively.”).

70.

Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard, Blog Legal Times (July 23, 2009, 11:43 AM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/07/specter-proposes-return-to-prior-pleadingstandard.html (internal quotation marks omitted).

71.

Christine P. Bartholomew, Death by Daubert: The Continued Attack on Private Antitrust, 35 Cardozo
L. Rev. 2147, 2187-88 (2014) (citations omitted).

72.

See Kris Franklin, Do We Need Subject Matter-Specific Pedagogies?, 65 J. Legal Educ. 839, 851
(2016).
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that students frequently assume this disproportionate impact has more to do
with the quality of the pleading in such cases than the plausibility standard
itself.
Thus, the second tier of challenge with Twiqbal arises from the lack of clarity
regarding what the new plausibility standard actually requires. Helping
students work through plausibility, and how its impact depends on the
substantive law at issue, requires providing students additional context to
evaluate Twiqbal—context beyond the edited opinions offered in casebooks.
C. The Challenges of Exploring Gatekeeping
Last, professors face a notable challenge in helping law students engage
with the rationale for more rigorous screening procedures. Questions of
procedural gatekeeping—the point at which alleged wrongdoing should be
kept out of the judiciary—are at the heart of civil procedure rules. Certainly
not every allegation of wrongdoing deserves a jury trial. But the question of
screening is more nuanced than whether screening is good or bad. Rather, at
what stage should the allegations be tossed?
Twiqbal reflects competing views over the judiciary’s ability to manage
the discovery process. For the court’s majority, judges are ill-equipped to
oversee discovery, inviting rampant discovery abuse.73 The dissent disagrees,
recognizing judges already have extensive case management tools. Thus,
discovery abuse concerns must be tempered by competing right to access
interests.74
As my students first discuss the decisions, they frequently accept the
arguments about the need for mitigating litigation costs at face value.75 The
decisions, alone, do not provide students enough context to interrogate the
merits of different screening opportunities, ranging from more stringent
case management techniques (such as staged discovery) to stronger reliance
on summary judgment mechanisms.76 This limits the depth of discussions
73.

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 559.

74.

See id. at 586-87.

75.

Such an assumption is faulty given the lack of supporting evidence. See Spencer, Pleading
and Access, supra note 23, at 1732 (“neither the Court nor any commentator has made the case
that the costs to defendants, to the litigation system, or to substantive legal concerns of
permitting such claims to go forward are so great as to warrant denying a prospective litigant
meaningful access to the courts, either in particular substantive contexts or across all cases
generally.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1621, 1643 (2012) (“This is not to say, however, that the regulatory mechanism the Court
selected to tighten the spigot on discovery—pleading standards—is the best one. Pleading
standards empower judges who have neither the information nor the incentives to make
wise decisions about which cases are worthy of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences
for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1396 (1994) (“[T]he massive discovery
reform agenda unleashed simultaneously through the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
the CJRA, and executive branch orders is based on questionable social science, ‘cosmic
anecdote,’ and pervasive, media-perpetuated myths.”) (footnote omitted).

76.

See, e.g., Bone, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 43, at 881 (“[E]ven in Iqbal, strict pleading
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regarding the function of civil procedure rules, including how to balance right
of access with efficiency.
Similarly, students do not know enough about the challenges of pre-discovery
factual investigation to anticipate how shifting plausibility from summary
judgments to motions to dismiss matters in practice. Since law students are
reading appellate decisions, their understanding of trial-level decisions, let
alone litigation strategy and pre-filing considerations, is thin, as such topics
are rarely more than passing discussions in most law school classes.77 When
Twiqbal is discussed later in upper-division courses, some students have more
context about what discovery entails, either from summer work experience or
through other coursework. But in the first year, students do not always intuit
the problems with obtaining pre-filing evidence. In reading a decision, the
facts are handed to students in paragraphs that unfold to provide a single
narrative. Competing facts (and thus competing narratives) are not provided,
except perhaps in the notes to the case or through lecture.
In addition to the timing of judicial screening, students frequently need
more context to weigh the trade-offs of a rigid pleading standard. For
defendants, the ambiguity over the new plausibility standard has converted a
motion to dismiss from an occasional motion to a virtually mandatory one.78
As Professors Clermont and Yeazell explain, “At a minimum, the fogginess
warns that any defendant’s lawyer, faced with a complaint employing the
minimalist pleading urged by Rule 8’s wording and the appended Forms’
content, commits legal malpractice if he or she fails to move to dismiss with
liberal citations to Twombly and Iqbal.”79 Each of these motions comes with
increased costs to the parties and the judiciary.
might not have been the best way to achieve an optimal policy balance. The lower courts
offered a promising alternative: thin screening followed by limited access to discovery before
subjecting the case to a more aggressive screening approach.”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra
note 7, at 849 (“[O]ne could have less disruptively attained an equivalent of the Twombly
and Iqbal regime by aggressively rereading Rule 11 rather than Rule 8.”) (footnote omitted).
77.

See, e.g., A.B.A. Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and
Professional Development—An Educational Continuum 234-35 (1992) (the “MacCrate
Report” named for Robert MacCrate, Esq., chairman of the task force) [hereinafter
MacCrate Report] (discussing the need for students to develop factual sensitivity).

78.

See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 49
Amer. U. L. Rev. 553, 556 (2010) (concluding through empirical study that there has been a
noticeable increase in the number of 12(b)(6) motions granted in district courts since these
decisions); see also Hon. Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 851, 853 (2008); Joe
S. Cecil, George W. Cort, Margaret S. Williams & Jared J. Bataillon, Fed. Judicial
Ctr., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal: Report to the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules vii (2011) (“There was a general
increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim . . . .”).

79.

Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 840 (footnote omitted).
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Another cost indicated by empirical research post-Twiqbal is the risk of false
positives, striking out cases based not on their potential merit but rather on
judges’ varying definitions of plausibility.80 For example, if Twiqbal was an
effective screen, one would have expected a corresponding drop in summary
judgment motions after the decisions; if more cases were screened out on
motions to dismiss, fewer questionable cases would need to be screened under
Rule 56.81 Instead, at least one study has shown there was no reduction in
summary judgments.82 Thus, the increased dismissals represent only a portion
of Twiqbal’s impact; they do not (and cannot) reflect the cases that go unfiled.
In this way, the heightened pleading standard screens twice: once when
plaintiffs are deciding whether to bring suit, then a second time on a motion
to dismiss.83 As Professors Robert Bone and David Evans aptly explain, early
screens generate costs of their own:
For example, strict pleading, which requires class plaintiffs to plead claims in
detail, creates error costs by making it harder for meritorious plaintiffs to file
legitimate class action suits and also increases process costs by inviting more
motions to dismiss. Moreover, because penalties must be set quite high to have
a substantial impact on filing incentives, the use of a penalty approach can
deter risk-averse plaintiffs from filing meritorious suits, and because hearings
must precede the imposition of penalties, process costs can rise as well.84

But students rarely have this additional context, which provides a critical
counterpoint to the narrowly framed efficiency arguments provided in the
decisions.
Thus, a final hurdle in teaching Twiqbal is providing students enough
context to question what gatekeeping is appropriate and when. Students
will and should reach different conclusions about the complicated needs for
gatekeeping and whether Twiqbal meets those needs. But those conclusions
should be rooted in a solid understanding of the trade-offs of increased, early
gatekeeping—trade-offs hardly evident from the majority opinions in Twiqbal.
80.

See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 550, 557 (2010)
(discussing how Twiqbal is an example of a transsubstantive procedural rule, working like a
substantive one, affecting some causes of action more than others).

81.

See Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Dispute over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 9
(forthcoming 2016).

82.

See id. at 9-10.

83.

See, e.g., Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial
Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 Fed. Courts L. Rev. 1, 7 (2011); Gelbach, Locking the Doors,
supra note 69, at 2314 (discussing how the empirical rate of increased motions to dismiss postTwiqbal only partially represents the impact of the new standard).

84.

Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke L.J. 1251,
1329 (2002).
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III. Proposed Solutions for Teaching Plausibility
As previously discussed, Twombly and Iqbal are challenging cases to
unpackage. Particularly for 1Ls, the implications of the cases are hardly
apparent from reading the decisions. As with challenging topics in other
courses, this complexity calls for more creative teaching solutions to help
provide students the requisite context to not just memorize but internalize
the plausibility standard.85 A lecture, alone, does not provide this opportunity.
This Part starts by describing the legal education goals and teaching theory
considerations I focused on to restructure how I teach plausibility. It then
discusses the specifics of the teaching methods I adopted. While the approach
I selected may appeal more to civil procedure professors, the design behind
those methods hopefully will resonate with legal professors more broadly.
A. Integrating Legal Education Goals & Pedagogy
Once I decided to move away from a strict lecture format, my goal was to
find an alternative approach to do more than just teach pleading. I wanted
to see if I could also integrate more practice-readiness skills into my class.
Employers and the judiciary have long pushed for increased skills training.86
As Professor David Oppenheimer also discusses in this symposium,87 research
ranging from the Carnegie studies88 to the American Bar Association’s Task
Force reports89 all emphasize the need for more practice-ready graduates.
Students and educators have joined this movement, seeking better preparation
for the tasks associated with the practice of law. However, law schools have
been slow to adapt. While they have expanded upper-division offerings to
include more practical-skills classes and problem-solving courses, the first-year
curriculum (and teaching of that curriculum) has generally changed little.90
85.

Accord Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. Legal Educ. 353, 373 (2012) (proposing
law professors “infuse our curriculum with factual, empirical and normative content far
beyond that which can be gleaned from appellate cases.”); Michael B. Mushlin & Lisa
Margaret Smith, The Professor and the Judge: Introducing First-Year Students to the Law in Context,
63 J. Legal Educ. 460, 461 (2014) (discussing the value of beginning law school students
receiving a “more contextual introduction to the profession”).

86.

Christine P. Bartholomew, Time: An Empirical Analysis of Law Student Time Management Deficiencies,
81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 897, 898 & n.1 (2013).

87.

See David Oppenheimer, Using a Simulated Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: The Ninety-Percent
Solution, 65 J. Legal Educ. 817, 819 (2016).

88.

See, e.g., Alfred Z. Reed, Training for the Public Profession
William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation
Law 89-91 (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report].

89.

90.

of the
for the

Law 281 (1921);
Profession of

See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Professional Competence, Final Report and
Recommendations of the Task Force on Professional Competence 6 (1983); Am.
Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and
Professional Development—An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force
on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 138-41, 233-36 (1992).
See Mushlin & Smith, supra note 85, at 480; cf. Gregory S. Munro, Outcomes Assessment

for Law Schools 84 (2000) (discussing how law schools are inherently slow at implementing
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Thus, ideally, any approach I adopted would deepen students’
understanding of pleading standards and include practice-ready objectives.
But the skills students need for practice are wide-ranging, and no single class
can teach all of them. I wanted to find a way to work on two concrete goals
proposed by the 2007 report on legal education by the Carnegie Foundation,
more commonly referenced as the Carnegie Report.91 This Report was notably
critical of how law schools often segregated analytical and practical training.
In particular, the Report focused on perceived issues with the Socratic method
and the need for more training on the ethical and political responsibilities of
the legal profession.92
One proposal for legal change suggested by the Report is to provide
“context-based learning.”93 Context-based learning is sometimes too narrowly
defined. The quintessential “context-based learning” example is a clinic or
externship, where students get hands-on experience with real cases. Such
opportunities are unquestionably valuable but often unavailable at the start
of law school. Hence, professors must seek out alternative ways to build
context in the first year. Providing students with context would not only
deepen students’ understanding of pleading standards, but also conforms to
the Report’s suggested changes in legal education. Hence, a “context-based
learning” goal for any revised approach to teaching plausibility was both
logical and synergistic.
The Report also proposes integrating instruction on professional judgment,
meaning “the ability to both act and think well in uncertain situations.”94 Such
judgment should be developed through “involvement in situations that are
necessarily indeterminate from the point of view of formal knowledge.”95
Pleading standards after Twiqbal provide the very opening for developing
such thinking. As discussed in Part II.B., what facts are necessary to plead a
“plausible” claim are still unclear, with courts taking differing positions both
intrasubstantively and transubstantively.
Thus, I locked down my initial framework for tweaking the class: my
new goal was to introduce pleading standards through a practice-readiness
approach that incorporates professional judgment. Legal education-specific
goals are a solid starting place for redesigning a class; however, those goals
would be achieved only if the specific methods I adopted were sound. By
change).
91.

See generally Carnegie Report, supra note 88. For a helpful summary of the Carnegie Report
and its findings, see Toni M. Fine, Reflections on U.S. Law Curricular Reform, 10 German L.J. 717,
720-25 (2009).

92.

Thomas Cothran, The Sophistic Method?: Dialectic and Eristic in Legal Pedagogy, 100 Ky. L.J. 177, 181
(2012).

93.

Carnegie Report, supra note 88, at 57, 136 (citing Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for
Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map 109-22 (2007)).

94.

Carnegie Report, supra note 88, at 9.

95.

Id. at 8.
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considering pedagogy research in evaluating a teaching method—in any of my
classes, not just civil procedure—I could refine the approach to squeeze every
potential benefit from the devoted class time. To this end, I focused on active
learning, group work, and chunking, as discussed below.
At this point in legal education, the gains of active learning methods are
well-established.96 Active learning methods, as opposed to passive learning,
“require[] students to [engage in] higher-order thinking [such as] analysis,
synthesis, and evaluation.”97 These gains—which are not limited to civil
procedure—include greater content retention and higher transfer of knowledge
in new situations.98 Such learning methods help students develop stronger
problem-solving skills and generate higher motivation for further learning.99
Given the problems students had processing the new pleading standards,
adopting an active-learning approach made sense. Through engaging in
higher-level thinking, students could explore the nuances of the standard while
developing professional judgment. Active learning allows me to place greater
emphasis on attitudes and values100 by allowing me to remediate students’ lack
of context through the use of real-world materials.101
96.

See generally Gary F. Hess, Principle 3: Good Practice Encourages Active Learning, 49 J. Legal Educ.
401, 402 (1999) (explaining how active learning in law school is not just a set of techniques
but also “an orientation . . . [that] includes a belief that legal education should help students
understand legal concepts and theory, improve critical thinking, and develop professional
skills and values.”); Michael Hunter Schwartz et al., Teaching Law by Design:
Engaging Students from the Syllabus to the Final Exam 4-8 (2009) (explaining that
cognitivists and constructivists recognize the importance of active learning activities).

97.

Elizabeth A. Shaver, LRW’s The Real World: Using Real Cases to Teach Persuasive Writing, 38
Nova L. Rev. 277, 281 (2014) (citation omitted).

98.

Charles C. Bonwell & James E. Eison, Active Learning: Creating Excitement
Classroom 2 (1991).

99.

See, e.g., Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, Taking Back the Law School Classroom: Using Technology to
Foster Active Student Learning, 54 J. Legal Educ. 551, 562 (2004) (“In larger classes, where active
learning is often very difficult to implement, its benefits become even more important.”)
(citation omitted); Mushlin & Smith, supra note 85, at 472 (discussing how students felt that
hands-on civil procedure exercises “took the mystery out of the practical application of what
[they] read about.”); Gary S. Goldstein, Using Classroom Assessment Techniques in an Introductory
Statistics Class, 55 C. Teaching 77, 78 (2007); Michael Prince, Does Active Learning Work? A Review
of the Research, 93 J. Engineering Educ. 223, 225-26 (2004).

in the

100. See Hess, supra note 96, at 405 (“assuming that most teachers are adept at transmitting
knowledge, they must also teach skills and values, and for those purposes active learning
methods are most effective.”); Bonwell & Eison, supra note 98, at 2.
101. See Susan A. Ambrose et al., How Learning Works 83 (2010) (discussing the importance
of “assigning problems and tasks that allow students to vividly and concretely see the
relevance and value of otherwise abstract concepts and theories”); Linda L. Berger, Do Best
Practices in Legal Education Include Emphasis on Compositional Modes of Studying Law as a Liberal Art?
Reporter’s Notes on “A Liberal Education in Law,” 1 J. Ass’n Legal Writing Directors 158, 160
(2002) (discussing how “learning theory endorses active learning in the context of real world
problems.”). Real-world problems also have the added benefit of generating higher student
motivation. See Ambrose et al., supra, at 84.
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However, I was hesitant to give up the aspects of lecture that did work.
Traditional Socratic lecture draws out some of the nuances of pleading
standards.102 For example, through a Socratic lecture, students can learn
the limitations of defining plausibility and recognize the competing policy
considerations articulated by the majority and dissents in the decisions.
Further, given the varying aspects of pleading standards I wanted to explore,
no single exercise would suffice; I needed to blend a series of interactive
exercises with lecture.
From there, I sought to maximize any interactive exercises by including a
group discussion component. Peer discussions increase students’ learning and
content retention103 but must be carefully circumscribed to generate these gains.
In my first few years of teaching, I noticed a handful of students frequently
dominated group discussions. It is easy for some students to disengage or
not see the value of the discussion. Group conversations, left undirected, can
also quickly fizzle out. Education scholars have written wonderful guides
for overcoming these problems,104 and I have intentionally integrated their
research into my own teaching. For example, designating students’ roles
increases participation in group discussions. Further, expressly identifying the
goals of the discussion helps students value the group discussion.105 Finally,
leaving the group discussion ungraded minimizes pressure and stimulates
students to collaborate and guide one another through the learning process.
Yet, the specter of problems with group discussions reinforced my decision
to interweave lecture with classwide and group discussion components.
Rather than initiating open-ended discussion of plausibility, interweaving
these components would allow me to “chunk,” meaning break the teaching
102. While the Socratic method has its critics, it also has benefits such as “help[ing] students:
(1) develop analytical skills; (2) think on their feet; (3) develop intellectual rigor; (4) learn
about the legal process; and (5) learn about the lawyer’s role or function.” Christine P.
Bartholomew & Johanna Oreskovic, Normalizing Trepidation and Anxiety, 48 Duquesne L. Rev.
354 (2010); see also Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Dichotomy: The Debate
Over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 BYU Educ. & L.J. 1, 4-5 (1998) (discussing the Socratic
method, including its benefits and deficiencies).
103. Howard E. Gruber & Morris Weitman, Self-Directed Study: Experiments in Higher
Education 2-5 (1962) (finding students taught through small, student-led discussions did
equal if not better on final examinations than students who heard the teacher lecture). This
is particularly true for millennials, meaning those students born between 1980 and the mid2000s. This generation of students values active learning, in particular group discussions.
See Patricia Vincent Roehling et al., Engaging the Millennial Generation in Class Discussions, 59 C.
Teaching 1, 2 (2010).
104. For a thorough discussion of group discussion research, see Marilla D. Svinicki & Wilbert
J. McKeachie, McKeachie’s Teaching Tips 38-57 (14th ed. 2014) (and accompanying
citations).
105. Providing goals also helps generate motivation. See, e.g., T.A. Ryan, Intentional Behavior:
An Approach to Human Motivation 145-47 (1970); T.R. Mitchell, Motivation: New Directions
for Theory, Research, and Practice, 7 Academy of Management Review 80, 83 (1982); Andrew
J. Elliot & James W. Fryer, The Goal Construct in Psychology, in James Y. Shaw & Wendi L.
Gardner (eds.) Handbook of Motivation Science 235 (2008).
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components into subproblems.106 Chunking makes an assignment or discussion
more manageable, allowing students to track progress by using short-term
goals as markers.107 However, for chunking to work, the professor must do
more than merely suggest guideposts; I had to carefully direct the students
through the discussion.108
Retaining some minimal lecture and group discussion component allowed
me to provide this guidance. Lecture would help students stay grounded
in the discussion and minimize the potential to rush ahead without fully
understanding the material. Guided group discussion would help students see
how each step of the exercise fits together. Students needed specific questions
to answer, as using questions results in higher quality of discussions.109 These
questions then would structure the student interaction and ensure students
are building the necessary learning blocks. After each exercise chunk, I could
use lecture to track and connect the exercise to the learning objectives. This
tracking creates helpful opportunities for reflection, allowing students more
time to absorb what they learned through their group dialogue. Weaving
exercises and lecture chunks also has added benefits in terms of increased
student attention and retention rates.
As for what the group discussions would focus on, I wanted to invite
opportunities for disagreement, as this, too, enhances the utility of student
discussion groups.110 “Constructive controversy” requires students to work
106. See Bartholomew, supra note 86, at 897, 941. Janeen Kerper, Let’s Space Out: Rethinking the Design
of Law School Texts, 51 J. Legal Educ. 267, 275 (2001) (discussing chunking and how it works);
see also Walter H. Gmelch, Stress for Success, 22 Theory Into Practice 7, 12 (1983) (discussing
how breaking larger projects into smaller chunks also minimizes stress and chance of
burnout). Chunking is particularly valuable for novice learners. See, e.g., Tracey A. Clarke,
Paul L. Ayres & John Sweller, The Impact of Sequencing and Prior Knowledge on Learning Mathematics
through Spreadsheet Application, 53 Educ. Tech. Res. & Dev. 15, 15-16 (2005).
107. By focusing on isolated tasks and then building to more complex questions, students
often learn more effectively than they do moving directly to the complex issues. See Dennis
C. Wightman & Gavin Lintern, Part-Task Training for Tracking and Manual Control, 27 Hum.
Factors 267, 270-71 (1985); Ron J.C.M. Salden, Fred Pass & Jeroen J.G. van Merrienboer,
A Comparison of Approaches to Learning Task Selection in the Training of Complex Cognitive Skills, 22
Computers in Hum. Behav. 321, 330 (2006).
108. Cf. Norman R.F. Maier, Principles of Human Relations 46 (Wiley ed., 1952); Norman
R.F. Maier, Problem-Solving Discussions and Conferences: Leadership Methods and
Skills 240 (McGraw-Hill ed., 1963) (discussing how groups are more effective if they deal
with one set of problems at a time rather than jumping to the end solution).
109. Norman R.F. Maier & Richard A. Maier, An Experimental Test of the Effects of “Developmental” vs.
“Free” Discussions on the Quality of Group Decisions, 41 J. Applied Psych. 320, 322 (1957); Daniel
Solomon, Larry Rosenberg & William E. Bezdek, Teacher Behavior and Student Learning, 55 J. of
Educ. Psych. 29 (1964) (finding teachers who used interpretive questions produced gains in
student comprehension).
110. David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, Creative Controversy: Intellectual Challenge
in the Classroom (1995) (providing experimental evidence that some disagreement can
generate curiosity, which is a basic motivation for learning).
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through and identify the source of disagreements.111 Such controversies create
opportunities for richer, more analytical discussions in the student groups.
This means the exercise component of the class needed to include problems
that were not clear cut.
Thus, in sum, with this research in mind, I solidified the frame for how I would
teach pleading standards, starting with legal education goals and pedagogy
research as the foundation. I would incorporate active learning, group
discussions, and chunking to help students understand pleading standards
while developing practice readiness and professional judgment. Admittedly,
it was a lofty plan, so I needed some check to see if what I designed would
actually work. Given that pleading standards come up early in the semester, I
needed a low-stakes formative assessment to evaluate how the learning process
unfolded.112 One option was to review students’ answers to guided discussion
questions. These answers would provide me with a snapshot of my students’
understanding of pleading standards and any potential deficiencies in the
class design. As these notes are cursory, their review would not take significant
time.113 By collecting and reviewing the group notes, however, I would gain
feedback as to what follow-up to provide, either with particular groups or with
the class as whole.114
But of course, all this planning and work on generating learning goals
was dependent on actually designing the specifics for the class. I still needed
to find a way to integrate Socratic lecture with exercises to provide students
the much-needed context to process Twiqbal. The details of what I adopted are
discussed next.
B. Teaching Twiqbal in Context—One Approach
With these practice-readiness goals in mind, I designed a tripartite approach
to teaching Twiqbal in a single class. The class is intentionally fast-paced and
covers significant ground. In advance of class, I assign students the casebook
pages that discuss pleading standards (and include excerpts from Twombly and
111.

Id.; David Johnson, Roger T. Johnson & Karl A. Smith, Constructive Controversy: The Educative
Power of Intellectual Conflict, Change Magazine 28, 30 (Jan./Feb. 2000).

112. See Stuckey et al., supra note 93, at 255 (discussing the distinction between formative and
summative assessments and their value in education).
113.

The value of such feedback is well-established. See, e.g., John M. Burman, Out-of-Class
Assignments as a Method of Teaching and Evaluating Law Students, 42 J. Legal Educ. 447 (1992);
Kristin B. Gerdy, Teacher, Coach, Cheerleader, and Judge: Promoting Learning through Learner-Centered
Assessment, 94 Law Libr. J. 59 (2002-4); Carol Springer Sargent & Andrea Anne Curcio,
Empirical Evidence that Formative Assessments Improve Final Exams, 61 J. Legal Educ. 379, 379 (2012)
(citing the extensive literature demonstrating that providing feedback to law students
“enhances student learning and performance” and that students “also believe they could
learn better if they had more feedback”).

114. Karen Wilson & James H. Korn, Attention During Lectures: Beyond Ten Minutes, 34 Teaching
Psychol. 85, 88 (2007) (providing research on the patterns of student attention in class and
suggesting this type of professor note-reviewing).
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Iqbal); a series of complaint excerpts (detailed below); and the relevant Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on pleading standards (Rules 8, 9, and 12(b)(6)).
Students often have limited experience reading complaints at this point in
the semester, so I instruct them to read the complaints for the general story
giving rise to the suit rather than decode all the legal jargon that may slow
their reading.
The class starts with the students breaking into groups of roughly four to
six. As the groups form, I explain the class that day will take a nontraditional
format, whereby lecture and exercises will be fused. I identify three goals for
the class: (1) understanding the change in the pleading standards since Conley;
(2) understanding the consequence of those changes; and (3) understanding
the competing reasoning for and against the changed pleading standards.115
Once the groups form, the students answer three questions individually,
then compare answers within the group: (1) Under Conley, what test should
courts apply to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint? (2) Under Twombly,
what test should courts apply to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint? and
(3) Under Iqbal, what test should courts apply to evaluate the sufficiency of a
complaint?116 These questions allow the students to self-assess their criticalreading skills and ability to identify controlling rules from cases—skills that
are just developing during the first semester of law school but should be fully
formed by the second semester. Comparing notes with their classmates lets
them see how they are doing relative to others, a form of feedback students
often crave. We then return to a classwide discussion. Groups share their
answers, then compare them to answers I post on PowerPoint slides. As the
remainder of the class is based on applying these different standards, taking
this time ensures students are all on board before going further.
Building on this foundation, students then work on three exercises to explore
the new pleading standards. Each student has a handout with the questions
for each set of exercises. For each exercise, one student in the group serves as
group leader and another is the scrivener (these roles rotate for each exercise
to maximize student involvement). The scrivener is asked to keep track of the
group’s responses to the questions on the handout. Throughout each exercise,
I circulate, checking in on the discussions and prompting groups through
questions if they are struggling or moving off track. After each exercise, we
return to a class discussion before moving on.
The exercises are increasingly challenging and provide openings to
remediate the three problems that arise teaching Twiqbal, as detailed in Part
II. In the first exercise (Exercise Set A), students answer questions based
115.

Spelling out these goals upfront helps minimize some of the student frustration that results
from a lack of education goals. See Cynthia Ho, Angela Upchurch & Susan Gilles, An ActiveLearning Approach to Teaching Tough Topics: Personal Jurisdiction as an Example, 65 J. Legal Educ.
772, 777-78 (2016) (discussing students’ struggles to identify learning objectives).

116. To help with clarity, I post all the questions for the class on PowerPoint slides and on the
exercise handout I distribute. See Nira Hativa, Teaching Large Law Classes Well: An Outsider’s View,
50 J. Legal Educ. 95, 105 (2000) (discussing how visual information helps with clarity).

Twiqbal In Context

767

on edited complaints from three different substantive areas: for example, an
employment claim, an antitrust claim, and a negligence claim.117 The class
handout includes the elements for each claim and instructs them to evaluate:
(1) whether facts for each element have been pled; (2) accepting the facts pled
as true, whether it is conceivable that a legal claim has been pled; and then (3)
whether the facts pled present a “plausible” claim.
This exercise in application provides the opening for students to see
differences between notice pleading and the plausibility standard under
Twiqbal. The students all agree the complaints satisfy the low threshold of
notice pleading, and they can articulate the general nature of the alleged
wrongdoing. Where things get trickier is answering questions (2) and (3).
When the inevitable chorus of “I don’t know” begins, students must articulate
why they are struggling. In identifying these challenges, the students begin to
see how the new plausibility standard differs from notice pleading. Students
rapidly recognize the challenges of parsing legal conclusions from facts. They
also begin to explore how plausibility may be relative as they debate whether
the allegations are plausible or if there is an equally plausible alternative
explanation.
For example, the last time I ran this exercise, one of the complaints the
students evaluated was from Khan v. Abercrombie. The complaint alleged unlawful
discrimination based on the plaintiff’s termination. The plaintiff alleges she
was terminated for wearing a hijab, though the complaint states Abercrombie
employees stated her termination was for violating its “Look Policy.”118 In
discussing the specific allegations, students quickly identified the competing,
potentially nondiscriminatory alternative explanation for the allegations.
Back in the class discussion, when asked to vote on whether they thought
the complaint stated a plausible claim, the students divided almost equally.
This division allowed me to segue into a discussion of how plausibility differs
based on individuals’ “experience and common sense.”119 By having students
first struggle to work through the test themselves, they more fully understand
the limitations of “experience and common sense” than they did just reading
Twombly and Iqbal, at least as evidenced by the quality of the class discussion.120
With this one exercise, students start exploring bigger questions about
the purpose of civil procedure. They begin to understand different pleading
117.

There is no particular magic to the complaints I choose. The only selection criterion I would
recommend is to pick complaints that neither require specialized knowledge nor are too
long. To ensure sufficient time for group discussion, I edited the complaints down to a single
cause of action and omitted jurisdiction allegations. I am happy to share the complaints I
have edited and any of the other teaching materials referenced in this Article upon request.

118. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 966 F. Supp.
2d 949, 955-56 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
119.

Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.

120. Notably, I have not attempted any empirical assessment to compare the prior teaching
method to the current one. Rather, my conclusions are anecdotal, based both on feedback
from students and my personal assessment of the discussion quality.
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standards and the challenges of defining plausibility. Further, this exercise
introduces a discussion of why certain causes of action fare better under the
Twiqbal standard than others do. As one student said, “How is the plaintiff
supposed to allege facts about what was going on in someone else’s head?”
Building on this discussion of judicial subjectivity, students move to
Exercise Set B, which consists of three antitrust complaints.121 At first blush,
the complaints seem similar: they involve the same legal theory (horizontal
restraint) and are roughly the same length. Just as in Twombly, the key issue is
whether each complaint pleads sufficient, plausible “plus factors” to satisfy the
“agreement/combination” element of a Sherman Act claim. However, only two
of the three survived motions to dismiss. Working in the same groups, students
again undertake the two-step process for evaluating a complaint identified in
Iqbal. From there, each group is divided into plaintiffs, defendants, and the
judiciary. Based on their role, the students argue for or against a motion to
dismiss. The student assigned as judge guides the discussion and eventually
“rules” on the motion, explaining the ruling to the parties.
After the groups work through the problems, we return to a class discussion.
Students again vote to identify the insufficient complaint. Students once again
disagree on the problematic complaint. This disagreement allows the class to
discuss the challenges of delineating a possible claim from a probable one.122
Further, the class discussion at this stage can also integrate a comparison of
the pleading standard for mistake and fraud under Federal Rule 9. This allows
students to explore the indistinct line between heightened pleading and the
Twiqbal standard, thus squarely addressing an issue students struggle to grasp
through lecture alone.
Finally, we look at Twiqbal’s practical implications in Exercise Set C. This
time, the focus is on allegations from the complaint in Iqbal.123 To foster fact
investigation skills, students brainstorm potential, additional allegations and
where to find evidence pre-discovery—both of which are practice-readiness
skills.124 The students draft two to three sentences of factual allegations based
121. If class time is an issue, one time-saving measure is to edit the complaints and focus solely
on one issue, such as horizontal agreement. The primary tip is to pick complaints that do
not require a highly technical understanding of a particular area of law. One sample triad is:
Second Consol. Am. Compl., Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010);
First Am. Compl. for Violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, In re Travel Agent
Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009); Consol. Compl., Haley Paint Co. v.
E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 419 (D. Md. 2011).
122. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”) (citation
omitted). To ensure this divide is not based on confusion about the complaints or challenges
reading the Supreme Court jurisprudence, I sample the groups by asking them to identify
the specific allegations in the complaint that support their conclusions.
123. This could just as easily be done using the complaint from Twombly, as the students now have
sufficient background on plus factors.
124. See Mushlin & Smith, supra note 85, at 471 (discussing how such pleading exercises take “on a
heightened importance” post-Twiqbal); see also Stephen Gerst & Gerald Hess, Professional Skills
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on these details. These allegations are then shared in their groups to evaluate
which allegations survive the two-step process from Iqbal. This brainstorming
ties directly into the problems distinguishing facts from conclusions.
In this round of the exercise, I check in with each group early on and
frequently. Sometimes students struggle at first on Exercise Set C, finding
themselves trying to work within the allegations of the complaint rather than
stepping back to consider hypothetical additional facts. Sometimes offering
examples clears this mental logjam and frees students to develop strategies for
planning pre-filing investigation. Once they complete this task, each group
discusses rationales for and against the new standard. This requires students to
identify and apply the theoretical and practical challenges created by Twiqbal,
ranging from pro-efficiency to right-to-access concerns.
Once again, the groups share their results with the class as a whole.
Through this exercise, students uncover the falsity of any clear-cut distinctions
between facts and legal conclusions—reinforcing an issue with the plausibility
test they initially recognized in the earlier exercises. They also begin to discuss
pre-filing strategies, including how to gather additional factual allegations.
This discussion then transitions into the challenges of gathering facts outside
discovery. It is during this phase of the group discussions that I disclose that I
worked on Twombly while in practice.125 With this experience, I discuss why the
amended complaint lacked more fleshed-out conspiracy allegations.
Exercise Set C also provides an opening to discuss, classwide, the potential
chilling effects of the plausibility standard and the competing efficiency
arguments. We can explore the impact of the new pleading standard, including
the empirical data highlighting how procedural alterations impact substantive
claims. This naturally segues into discussions of whether Twiqbal runs contrary
to the transsubstantive goals of civil procedure rules.
By reserving these issues until the last set of exercises, the policy discussion
goes beyond just recitation of the stated considerations in Twombly and Iqbal.
Instead, the students connect the two competing issues to the other cases they
examined in Exercise Sets A and B and to their own struggles in articulating
arguments for and against a motion to dismiss. We also talk about what
advice they would have given the respective parties in Iqbal: would they have
recommended filing the motion to dismiss if they represented the defendants?
What would they have advised Mr. Iqbal upon receipt of the motion? From
there, we debate some of the proposed legislative reforms and consider why
they have not gained traction. Thus, this last exercise set provides an opening
for students to develop professional judgment. Not only do they have to
consider challenges advising clients about an uncertain area of procedure,
and Values in Legal Education: The GPS Model, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 513, 521 (2009) (listing pleading
drafting as important for a high level of competency in practice).
125. This disclosure helps overcome the skepticism students sometimes have about law
professors’ assessments of real world implications. See Rand, supra note 62, at 749 (observing
that “students will resist the material, and be skeptical of its efficacy, unless the lessons are
explicated through an accessible set of specific, real-life examples.”).
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they also begin to contemplate larger implications of this uncertainty to justice
and judicial access.
At the end of the exercise, I collect each group’s notes for review and
feedback. My review focuses on the students’ written explanations for the
foundational questions and each exercise set. The written responses for the
foundational questions particularly help me assess the development of criticalreading skills, which guides show much time to spend working on how to
read cases in future lectures. I can also gauge students’ understanding of
key legal terms (such as pleading, complaint, and cause of action) and legal
analysis concepts (such as the distinction between elements and factors). On
occasion, a group’s answers may be too cursory. For example, one group’s
responses to the questions in Exercise Set B simply said “yes” without any
further consideration of alternative arguments. When I identify such groups,
I can write a note on the handout suggesting the group come in during office
hours to talk through the exercises further. Thus, not only do students gain
from the exercise, the exercise helps identify and remedy potential confusion
before moving onto other topics.
The student response to these exercises has been positive. Students have
commented how the exercises highlight the difference between notice pleading
and plausibility pleading. One student said the class “clarified the difference
between Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal better than the reading.”126 They noted the
exercises help them understand the limitations of the plausibility standard.
Students have also said this approach solidified that civil procedure rules are
not absolute, confirming this approach helps develop professional judgment.
As one student said, “These exercises helped me see that there is a lot of grey
area in pleading requirements.” As with any teaching method, though, there
are limitations. Some students suggest the exercises would be improved if they
had more time for group discussion or if I picked the groups for the students.
Another student requested I distribute hard copies of the complaints rather
than electronic copies the students then needed to print themselves.
Overall, these critiques, though, are overshadowed by the positive
feedback. As this particular class often takes place during the first few weeks
of the semester, students have said the exercises provide them their first real
understanding of the importance of civil procedure. One student said, “I
learned that all these rules actually impact the definition of justice.” While
initially civil procedure cases seem less sexy than students’ reading for criminal
law or torts, students start seeing that procedure matters. And getting a 1L to
buy into that precept is no small victory.
Conclusion
While civil procedure professors may be loath to concede it, pleading
standards rarely move students to great excitement. Despite many students’
126. To assist in drafting this Article, I added a final part of the Exercise, which was to solicit
student feedback on the restructured class.
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lack of innate passion, procedure defines the pragmatic contours of substantive
law. As civil procedure professors well know, before exploring the intersection
of procedure and substantive law, we must first remedy law students’ lack of
context. Adding context benefits students’ conceptual understanding of the
plausibility standard and allows them to more fully engage with the critical
questions it raises.
Providing context is hardly a problem unique to pleading standards or civil
procedure, though. I hope this Article stimulates thought about the process that
leads to alternative teaching methods beyond the civil procedure classroom.
Many a law professor has that one topic that just does not seem to work as
currently taught. Sometimes those subjects create the ideal environment for
creative teaching methods to overcome those obstacles. I make no claims that
my proposed teaching methods are either optimal or novel. The only claim
I can make is that teaching pleading through these exercises helps develop
practice-readiness skills while building the critical reading and analytical skills
essential to success in both law school and practice. And by taking a chance to
walk away from the podium for a while—giving over precious lecture time—I
found one way to make a clear class out of muddled law.

